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LOOKING AHEAD:
THE MICROSOFT CASE: In August, Microsoft announced that it was appealing the
ruling in its antitrust case to the United States Supreme Court.
Antitrust and Verify;
1Yill Microsoft Admit It Has Lost?
The New Republic
July 23, 2001
Lawrence Lessig
Lamer L essg is pr(ssor f law at Starford
Uniwesity His fodmrang bok, 7he Frawe <f
Ides: The Fate f the CGmr in a Cawta
Wod udill bepuhlihd byRandomnHouse
Late last month, the Court of Appeals for
the D.C Circuit unanimously found that
Microsoft had violated America's antitrust
laws. In an unsigned opinion, the court
held unequivocally that Microsoft was a
monopolist that used its power to protect
itself against nascent competition.
Yet that's not the way Microsoft--and, in
turn, the press--spun it. "Microsoft
spared: appeals court overturns breakup
order, assails trial judge," proclaimed The
San Francisco Chronicle in a typical
headline. "Gates wins a round in court,"
blared a follow-up piece in the Houston
Chronicle. That spin isn't just wrong; it
signals something dangerous. Much as he
did after settling the government's first
antitrust case with a consent decree in
1994, Bill Gates has been arguing that this
latest ruling permits Microsoft to go on as
if nothing had happened. That's not true.
And now the Bush administration and the
states need to deliver that message very
clearlyto Chairman Gates.
In April 2000, Judge Thomas Penfield
Jackson found Microsoft guilty of
multiple violations of antitrust law. After
refusing to grant Microsoft a hearing on
remedies, Jackson ordered the company
split. The swiftness of the remedy
surprised all concerned. Jackson seemed
keen to let the appellate courts first decide
whether the findings of liability were
correct; after that question was resolved,
he figured, the remedy would be easier to
revisit--which is what will happen now.
The findings of liability were essentially inthree parts. First, and most importantly,
Jackson found that Microsoft had engaged
in "defensive monopolization"--that it had
used its monopoly power to protect itself
against competitors that might threaten its
dominance in the PC operating-system
market. Second, Jackson found that
Microsoft had engaged in illegal tying bybolting its Web browser, Internet
Explorer, to its monopoly operating
system, Windows. And, third, Jacksonfound that Microsoft had attempted to
monopolize the browser market with
Internet Explorer.
Microsoft challenged all three conclusions.
If you count these as three separate
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arguments, the Court of Appeals
unanimously rejected two out of three. By
my count of the actual number of
decisions the court made in its 125-page
opinion, Microsoft lost 36 of 49. But if
you look at the substance of what the
Court of Appeals decided, then Microsoft
might as well have lost all 49. For on
every important question of liability, the
government prevailed.
Yes, the order to split the company was
reversed--both because Microsoft did not
get the hearings it deserved and because
the rules of liability were changed by the
Court of Appeals in the course of its
opinion. And it is true that Microsoft
prevailed on the third charge, the
"attempted monopolization" of the
browser market though it was always hard
to view that charge as anything more than
the government piling on. But on the
rulings that matter most to the question of
liability, the government won big.
First, on the claim of monopolization, the
court found that Microsoft's licenses with
computer manufacturers such as Compaq
were anti-competitive. It found that the
integration of Internet Explorer with
Windows was anti-competitive. It found
that Microsoft's agreements with Internet
access providers and independent
software vendors were anticompetitive.
And while the court found that
Microsoft's Java strategy--improving Java
in ways that tilted it toward Windows--
was not wholly anti-competitive, it clearly
affirmed Jackson's finding that the core of
Microsoft's behavior with respect to Java
was illegal.
Likewise, Microsoft largely lost on the
question of tying. While the court did
reverse the finding of liability, it did not
adopt Microsoft's liability standard--i.e.,
permitting a tie whenever the bundle
provided a "plausible benefit." Microsoft
had argued that this was the appellate
court's own test from its consent decree
case in 1998. The court flatly rejected that
argument. Instead, it sketched a modified
test for determining whether there is a tie
involving "platform software" (roughly,
software upon which other software runs).
Rather than presume anti-competitive
effects from a platform-software tie (as
the Supreme Court's rule for ordinary
products would), the Court of Appeals
now requires that anti-competitive effects
be shown. Given that the government has
already shown similar effects in
establishing the "defensive
monopolization" claim, it is quite likely it
would be able to show anti-competitive
effects under the court's new test. But the
appellate court wasn't entirely sure, so it
sent the claim back to give the lower court
another chance.
These two holdings reaffirm an important
antitrust principle: A platform monopolist
such as Microsoft may not use its power
over the platform to stifle innovation that
threatens it. This is true whether the
monopolist exercises its power through
contracts or through the design of its
code. Together, the holdings make clear
that competition must be on merit and
not through bundling tricks.
But has Microsoft gotten the message?
From the beginning of this case, the
company's leaders have insisted on a
single, simple argument: Their behavior
did not violate the law. Was there "any
limit" to what Microsoft could put into its
operating system? Said Microsoft
President Steve Ballmer last month,
"$(A$)s a matter of law, no." As Ballmer
insisted, Microsoft was "one hundred
percent" innocent.
And there's reason to believe Microsoft's
leadership still feels exactly the same way.
For without even pausing to acknowledge
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the essence of the court's opinion--
without even a hint that, in fact, the
company and its chairman have been
proven wrong--Microsoft has launched a
massive publicity campaign to convince
the world it has won. Not just that the
order to split the company has been
reversed, but that, on the merits of
liability, Microsoft's "freedom to
innovate" has been affirmed. Immediately
after the decision, Gates told the press:
"There's nothing in today's ruling that
changes our plan for our future products."
When a swooning Lou Dobbs of CNN
asked Gates if the finding of
monopolization was "purely an academic
finding," Gates replied, "Well, although
that wasn't the central issue, it does touch
on some licensing practices," and those,
Gates allowed, would have to be
reviewed.
We've heard this before. When the
government first sued Microsoft in 1994
and then settled the suit with a consent
decree, the ink wasn't dry before Gates
essentially announced to the world that
the decree wouldn't matter. Indeed, he
used practically the same words: "None of
the people who run those divisions are
going to change what they do or think or
forecast," he said then. "There's one guy
in charge of licenses. He'll read the
agreement."
In the fall, Microsoft will launch the first
versions of its vision of the future--.Net,
Hailstorm, and a new version of its
operating system, Windows XP. The
bundling of disparate software elements
into these new products makes the
bundling of Windows and Internet
Explorer look like child's play. This week,
Microsoft freed computer manufacturers
to bundle a different browser with
Windows XP. But this concession does
not begin to address the questions about
bundling raised by the court's opinion.
Microsoft has bet the company on a
strategy of tying together a vast range of
products into a single Microsoft platform.
From authentication to instant messaging,
Windows-flavored code will do it all. No
doubt some of this bundling is perfectly
OK under the appellate court's test. And
it is possible that the bunch together
could be developed consistently with the
law. But, given the vast range of functions
being tied to the operating system, it is
impossible to believe that a fair reading of
the court's opinion would not raise
questions about some--perhaps much--of
it.
Microsoft's refusal, however, even to
acknowledge the principle in the court's
opinion--or to acknowledge that this
principle is different from the "freedom"
it has consistently espoused--forces the
government's hand. Were Microsoft
willing to talk honestly about the rule the
court has set, then relatively simple
remedies, perhaps even a fine, would be
enough. But when the company insists
that black is white--that its "freedom to
innovate" has been unaffected by thisloss--then it is hard for a government
charged with enforcing the law to ask for
anything less than the strongest remedy
possible--including a breakup. If the
company with the greatest power over the
Internet's future won't even acknowledge
the law, then the government must make
sure it can't use its power illegally to direct
that future anymore.
Copyright c 2001 New Republic, Inc.
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LOOKING AHEAD:
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION: There are contradictory rulings
involving the University of Michigan's undergraduate and law school admissions programs
which have been appealed to the 6 U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.
Focus on Affinnative Action in Mich.
The Associated Press
Tuesday, June 26, 2001
Alexandra R. Moses
Though the U.S. Supreme Court let
stand a ruling that led Texas to abandon
a raced-based admissions policy at its
colleges and universities, it may not be
the court's last word on the subject.
Two separate appeals winding their way
through the courts involve University of
Michigan policies that consider race when
evaluating applicants to its undergraduate
and law schools.
Some experts believe Michigan's debate is
headed to the high court.
On Monday, the nation's highest court
declined to hear Texas' appeal to a 1996
ruling that its law school affirmative
action program discriminated against
whites.
The Michigan cases offer "very well-
written opinions going in different
directions, which always helps," said Doug
Kmiec, dean of the Catholic University of
America law school.
In March, U.S. District Judge Bernard
Friedman struck down the Michigan law
school's affirmative action policy saying
the admissions criteria were not clearly
defined and relied too heavily on race.
The university is continuing
policy pending appeals.
to use the
Friedman's ruling contradicted that of
U.S. District Judge Patrick Duggan, who
in December affirmed Michigan's
undergraduate admissions standards, in
place since 1999. Duggan ruled that
diversity on a public college campus is a
compelling state interest and a valid
admissions criterion.
Both cases are being appealed to the 6th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in
Cincinnati. Oral arguments are scheduled
for October.
Kmiec said the Supreme Court needs a
new case to move the issue of race-based
admissions policies forward from its 1978
Bakke case, which allowed consideration
of race in university admissions but
outlawed racial quotas.
"The court has already staked out its
general principal and that is race shouldn't
be used for public decision-making
without a compelling governmental
interest," Kmiec said.
"The case that the court wants for the
next round is not a case that just allows
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those high-level thoughts ... but rather a Bakke decision," Levey said. "They sort of
case that allows those high-level thoughts owe it to the public."
... and applies (them) to a concrete real-
world situation." Copyright 0 2001 The Associated Press
But others argue it is hard to read too
much into Monday's action because the
Supreme Court agrees to hear few cases.
"Nobody should read anything into it
except the fact that the Supreme Court
was not prepared to address the issue at
this time." said Robert Sedler, professor
of constitutional law at Detroit's Wayne
State University.
"There's just no margin in reading the tea
leaves of the Supreme Court," added Liz
Barry, University of Michigan deputy
general counsel. "This doesn't say
anything about how the Supreme Court
will affect our case."
Michigan's law school relies on grades and
exam scores but considers applicants who
have low scores but "may help achieve
that diversity which has the potential to
enrich everyone's education."
Applicants to the undergraduate school
are graded on a 150-point scale. Blacks,
Hispanics and American Indians get 20
points for their race - equal to raising their
grade-point average a full point on a 4-
point scale.
Whatever case it chooses, the Supreme
Court needs to address affirmative action
in admissions policies, said Curt Levey,
spokesman for the Center for Individual
Rights, a conservative legal group which
brought the lawsuits in the Michigan and
Texas cases.
"It's an issue of national importance. The
U.S courts of appeal are so divided, and
there's a lot of confusion concerning the
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LOOKING AHEAD:
AID TO PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS: The 4' U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling inJuly in favor of parochial schools receiving some public funding. Other circuits have ruled
that this practice is unconstitutional. President Bush's administration has spoken out in
favor of providing vouchers for "faith-based" education.
Courts Say Sectarian Schools May Receive Public Funding
The Washington Times
Monday, July 2, 2001
Larry Witham
New federal court rulings agree that a
"pervasively sectarian" organization may
receive public funds as a matter of
government neutrality toward religion, a
reversal of Supreme Court thinking from
the 1970s.
The latest ruling came June 26, when the
4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in
Richmond said Columbia Union College,
a Seventh-day Adventist school in
Takoma Park, must be given access to
Maryland state funds provided to other
schools.
The court said that despite the college's
close ties to a church, providing funds to
it under the state's Father Sellinger
Program does not establish religion in
violation of the Constitution.
The First Amendment
government neutrality, not
religious belief," the appeals
said.
"requires
hostility, to
court ruling
The result in the 9-year-old case adds to a
new trend in court thinking, advocates
say. Now, the court is less concerned
whether an organization is "pervasively
sectarian," or very religious, and is
more concerned that government not
penalize such groups in comparison to
other organizations.
Last year, in a 6-3 ruling that allowed
Louisiana Catholic schools to receive state
funding for secular materials such as
computers, Supreme Court Justice
Clarence Thomas said in the majority
opinion that a history of prejudice was
behind penalizing overtly religious
organizations.
"It was an open secret that 'sectarian' was
a code for 'Catholic,"' he wrote. "This
doctrine, born of bigotry, should be
buned now."
In the new ruling, the federal appeals
court cited Justice Thomas' assertion in
the so-called Mitchell case in Louisiana.
"The 4th Circuit has now interpreted that
Mitchell, in fact, is saying the 'pervasively
sectarian' doctrine is dead," said Curt
Levey, legal director for the Center for
Individual Rights, which defended
Columbia Union. "It has been replaced by
something the court has called 'neutrality
plus."' That was a term other justices usedin the Mitchell decision on the Louisiana
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schools.
Mr. Levey said the new federal appeals
court ruling is likely to play a major role in
the courts if the so-called charitable
choice intitiative expands and critics begin
to file lawsuits against welfare ministries
that take federal funds.
"Everyone is assuming that this ruling is
what will apply to the welfare-providing
groups," he said.
Under a 1996 charitable choice law,
ministry groups may bid for welfare funds
without stripping away their religious
identity or governance. Opponents,
however, say the law violates separation of
church and state.
During Senate Judiciary Committee
hearings this month, Justice Department
lawyer Carl Esbeck said the doctrine of
"neutrality" will make it legally "irrelevant"
whether a ministry that produces
effective welfare results with government
funds is "pervasively sectarian" or not.
In the Supreme Court opinion last year,
Justice Thomas traced the "pervasively
sectarian" doctrine to the early 1900s,
when a predominantly Protestant political
system sought to restrict Catholic schools,
which boomed under high immigration.
The term was used in state laws and
courts and then was adopted in the 1970s
by the Supreme Court.
The Columbia Union case has roots in the
1971 Sellinger Program, in which
Maryland allowed education funding for
aspects of its Catholic colleges and
universities. The American Civil Liberties
Union sued the state to stop the funding,
but the Supreme Court's 1976 ruling in
Roemer v. Maryland set guidelines for
such funding to continue.
In 1992, Maryland's attorney general said
Columbia Union was so religious that it
had "more formal ties to the church and
less institutional autonomy" than required
to receive funds, even for secular subjects
and materials.
After the ruling in favor of the Seventh-
day Adventist college, its president,
Randal Wisbey, lauded Maryland's
financial aid to independent schools. "We
look forward to putting this matter behind
us and moving on," he said.
Copyright o 2001 News World
Communications.
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LOOKING AHEAD:
VIRGINIA'S MOMENT-OF-SILENCE: The 4' U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals issued a
ruling in July that upheld the constitutionality of Virginia's moment-of-silence law as long as
it does not encourage nor discourage religion.
Judges Embrace a Silent Tread on Freedoms
The Washington Post
Thursday, July 26, 2001
Marc Fisher
Even the judges who this week
embraced Virginia's moment of silence
law agree that for it to be constitutional,
it must neither encourage nor discourage
religion.
So how in the world did a 2 to 1 majority
on the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
give thumbs up to a law that forces public
school children to start each day with a
minute in which the state suggests they
"meditate, pray, or engage in any other
silent activity"?
Well, simple, wrote Judge Paul V.
Niemeyer in the majority opinion. The
state legislator who proposed the silent
minute, Sen. Warren E. Barry (R-Fairfax),
said he did so "out of the frustrations that
many of us have felt based on the violence
in some of our schools." The intent
wasn't to promote prayer, so the law's
okay. Next case.
Ah, but listen to another statement the
very same Sen. Barry made about his
intent: "This country was based on belief
in God, and maybe we need to look at
that again." Hinmrn. What was that about
encouraging religion?
Calm yourselves, civil libertarians. It turns
out that Barry made that latter comment
to a reporter, not on the floor of the
Senate. Therefore, the court is going to
put its collective paws over its ears and
hum loudly and look eagerly back to that
other bit about curbing violence in the
schools.
Courts too often do not deal in reality. It's
so much easier to parse precedent, obey
orders and find the words you need to
support your position. The majority must
have grown giddy when they found that
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor once said, "It is difficult to
discern a serious threat to religious liberty
from a room of silent, thoughtful
schoolchildren."
All the appeals court judges had to do
now was conclude that every child in
Virginia, from kindergarten to high
school, is thoughtful and respectful, and
that every teacher will rigorously enforce
the neutrality of the moment of silence,
and we're all off to the prayer room -- un,
classroom.
"The silence is designed to be undirected
and unthreatening," Niemeyer wrote. "It
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is designed to exert no coercion except
that of maintaining silence."
Such a law might be fair for educated,
tolerant adults, but those who do not toil
in the hushed confines of mahogany
courtrooms know that not every
classroom is perfectly respectful of
different religious traditions or, God
forbid, of those who want nothing more
from school than rigorous learning and
sharp, good-hearted teachers.
The children who went to court to fight
the moment of silence know well that
some of their peers are hungry to use that
minute to promote the majority faith.
There are already reports statewide of
teachers encouraging children to pray
aloud. If the behavior of the authority
figure has no coercive effect on a first-
grader, then pray tell, what does?
Niemeyer calls this a "speculative" fear
and comforts himself that the moment of
silence is splendidly neutral because "what
transpires in the mind cannot be known
by others."
But Judge Robert B. King, in a dissent
that good high school teachers might want
to have kids read during the moment of
silence, accuses the state of "invading ...
the hearts and minds of Virginia
schoolchildren in an effort to once more
usher state- sponsored religion into public
schools."
King sees the silence law for what it is: a
"Trojan Horse, a hollow guise" for state-
sponsored prayer. The "secular" purpose
of the law is, King says, "patently
insincere." Far from protecting free
exercise of religion, Virginia's law -- which
requires students to stay seated and
silent -- prevents Catholics such as anessa
Brown of Fairfax from kneeling or
standing as she prays and stops Amy
Cohen of McLean, who is Jewish, from
praying through song.
The Supreme Court has said repeatedly
that, as Justice John Paul Stevens put it,
"nothing in the Constitution prohibits any
public school student from voluntarily
praying at any time before, during, or after
the schoolday." But that's not enough for
zealots who would stomp on those who
pray a different way, or not at all.
Virginia's moment of shame is headed for
the high court. Until then, the state's
children must suffer the selfish whims of
those who cannot comprehend our basic
freedoms.
Copyright c 2001 The Washington Past
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